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NOTE
CLERGY MALPRACTICE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
Clergy malpractice-the subject sparks controversy among spiri-
tual law givers as well as secular law makers." At the same time that
academics observe the increasing number of tort suits alleging clergy
malpractice,2 churches and pastors are banding together to quell the
new army of litigants. Indeed, church organizations are even taking af-
firmative measures to protect themselves, including printing newslet-
ters to warn of recent legal trends,3 establishing workshops to train
clergy in ways of avoiding liability,4 and purchasing insurance to pro-
tect pastors, churches, and congregations from potential lawsuits.5
The tort theory of clergy malpractice has expanded beyond its
conceptual limits to become a convenient label for any cause of action
against clergy.6 Courts already recognize that clergy are liable for negli-
1. See generally Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Of-
ficers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 79 nn.480-81 (1986)
(detailing many professional and scholarly articles written on clergy malpractice).
2. See generally infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing lawsuits alleging
clergy malpractice).
3. See, e.g., Clergy Malpractice Alert (monthly newsletter for church leaders pub-
lished by R. McMenamin of Portland, Oregon).
4. Many state bar associations offer clergy malpractice workshops for lawyers and
clergymen. For example, the Fuller Theological Seminary sponsors a yearly clergy mal-
practice workshop in California; the University of South Carolina School of Law co-spon-
sors a "Clergy and the Law Seminar" with the Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary;
and the University of Wisconsin co-sponsors a seminar entitled "The Clergy Malpractice
Threat" with the Fox Valley Pastoral Counseling Center.
5. See Quade, Holy Terror: Clergy Buying Insurance, 69 A.B.A. J. 1206 (1983).
6. See, e.g., McMenamin, Civil Interference and Clerical Liability, 45 JURIST 275
(1985) ("clergy malpractice" often is used in describing broader fields of offenses and
actions, including "child abuse, theft, poor teaching, [and] paternity"); Note, Clergy
Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (1988) (including intentional tort and invasion of privacy as part of
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gence in secular activities,7 as well as for intentional torts.8 On the
other hand, scholars generally agree that parishioners cannot sue clergy
for negligently performing traditional sacraments, services and other
purely sacerdotal acts such as funerals, baptismals, or weddings.9 To
avoid creating redundant remedies, courts should not label currently
recognized torts as clergy malpractice, 10 but should limit application of
this theory to ministerial1 1 counseling, 12 as several courts already have
recognized.' 3 Accordingly, this Note is limited to clergy liability for
clergy malpractice).
7. See, e.g., Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 49 Cal. App. 3d 877, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 171 (1975) (priest sued for negligence in automobile collision); Brillhart v. Scheier,
243 Kan. 591, 758 P.2d 219 (1988) (parish pastor sued for negligence in operating a mo-
tor vehicle); Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 511 (La. 1979) (church responsible for
pastor's negligence in failing to keep aisles clear).
8. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Sandford, 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399 (1912) (false imprison-
ment); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Mo. App. 1987) (alienation of affections,
defamation, invasion of privacy, and interference with contractual relations); Christoffer-
son v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982) (fraud), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1206, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419
P.2d 132 (1966) (alienation of affections); Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash. 574, 135 P. 640
(1913) (kidnapping of a minor). See generally Esbeck, supra note 1, at 76-113 (discuss-
ing constitutionality of specific intentional tort claims against churches and ecclesiastical
officers); Comment, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines for Criminal Activities,
Tort Liability, and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1025 (1977) (providing
analysis of civil liability for intentional torts asserted against leaders of religious organi-
zations); Annotation, Free Exercise of Religion Clause of First Amendment as Defense
to Tort Liability, 93 A.L.R. FED. 754 (1989) (surveying tort cases against religious leaders
in which first amendment was plead as defense).
9. See Bergman, Is the Cloth Unravelling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9
SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 47, 53 (1981).
10. For the same reason, clergy malpractice also should not include nonreligious
activities arising in the counseling context. See infra note 55 (sexual affair). Similarly,
criminal acts by clergy counselors also should be excluded from the scope of clergy mal-
practice. See infra note 98 (religious sacrifice).
11. This note shall use "minister" and "clergy" synonymously. The terms are not
limited to one particular sect or religion, but are intended to be a general label for every
religious leader conducting spiritual counseling.
12. This note uses "'spiritual counseling' as a generic term for what is often re-
ferred to in the Jewish and Christian traditions as 'pastoral care,' that is, counseling
conducted by a personal counselor who is vested with religious authority (a 'spiritual
counselor') and whose counsel is actually or potentially derived from religious precepts."
Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outra-
geous Conduct be Free Exercise?, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1296, 1297 n.3 (1986).
13. See Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682, 684-85 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam); Hes-
ter v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Strock v. Presnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d
207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988) ("[Clergy] [m]alpractice . . . is not a theory of ordinary
negligence or of intentional tort. It is a separate and distinct cause of action."). Some
commentators have adopted more specific terms. See Ericsson, Clergymen Malpractice:
Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163, 163-64 (1981) (spiritual counsel-
[Vol. 41
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negligent counseling and does not examine other tort theories.14
The paradigm case15 for clergy malpractice is Nally v. Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley.1 6 In Nally, Walter and Maria Nally sued
a local church and four of its pastors, alleging that negligent counsel-
ing 7 caused their twenty-four year old son to commit suicide. 8
While a student at the University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLA), Kenneth Nally converted from his family religion, Roman Ca-
ing malpractice).
14. Some courts have creatively "invented" new intentional torts to avoid holding
clergy liable for counseling malpractice. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church of
the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter
after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989) (holding church and pastor liable for negligent failure to prevent
suicide as a nonprofessional therapist).
For a full discussion of Nally, see infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text. When a
court uses an intentional tort theory as an indirect means to hold a pastor liable in order
to avoid the label of clergy malpractice, it still may run into the same constitutional
obstacles encountered under clergy malpractice. See infra notes 53-208 and accompany-
ing text. Accordingly, each "indirect" clergy malpractice case should be analyzed under
the same constitutional standards as cases openly charging clergy negligence in
counseling.
Similarly, any cause of action based on an intentional tort theory rooted in the con-
tent of counseling or instruction rather than the physical acts of the counselor (e.g. in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress) may be unconstitutional. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
15. Although other cases have plead clergy malpractice for negligent counseling,
none have succeeded under a negligence theory. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So.
2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam) (dismissing negligent counseling claim for failure to state
a claim); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (dismissing ministerial
malpractice claim for failure to allege cause of action); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d
207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988) (dismissing malpractice claim because sexual activity by
counselor was not religiously motivated); see generally Sherman, Nation's Courts Reject
"Clergy Malpractice" Suits, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 10, col. 1 (discussing recent
clergy malpractice litigation); Annotation, supra note 8, at 801-05 (surveying negligent
counseling cases).
16. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App.
1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 253
Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
17. The complaint actually alleged three causes of action: clergy malpractice (negli-
gent counseling in failing to refer Nally to a "professional"); negligence (church was neg-
ligent in training and hiring counselors); and outrageous conduct (defendant's religious
beliefs and teachings caused Nally to experience guilt and anxiety). Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr.
at 221-22.
18. For a detailed factual analysis of this case, see Note, Seeing in a Mirror Dimly?
Clergy Malpractice as a Cause of Action: Nally v. Grace Community Church, 15 CAP.
U.L. REv. 349, 356-58 (1986), and Case Note, Religious Counseling-Parents Allowed to
Pursue Suit Against Church and Clergy for Son's Suicide-Nally v. Grace Community
Church, 1985 Amiz. ST. L.J. 213, 214-17 (1985).
1990]
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tholicism, to Protestantism. 19 Nally then began attending Grace
Church. After graduating from UCLA in 1976, Nally attended the Bi-
ola College in La Mirada for one semester and enrolled in the Talbot
Theological Seminary. An extention of Grace Church was located on
the grounds of the seminary.20 Nally became a close friend of one of
the church's pastors and frequently sought advice on problems with his
girlfriend, as well as on problems of personal depression and family
conflicts.2 In 1978, Nally entered into a "formal" counseling and disci-
pleship program with another pastor at Grace Church, but quit after
five sessions.
2
After breaking up with his girlfriend in December of 1978, Nally
became despondent and told his mother he could no longer "cope"
with life. 23 She sent him to two general practitioners, who conducted
chemical analyses and prescribed a strong anti-depressant drug.
2'
Nally's depression did not subside and in late February 1979 he spoke
briefly with a pastor at Grace Church during a drop-in counseling ses-
sion. 25 A few weeks later, Nally attempted suicide by overdosing on the
prescribed anti-depressant drug.2 6 Nally's parents rushed him to a hos-
pital for treatment, but rejected a psychiatrist's pleadings to commit
Nally to a psychiatric hospital.2 7 Over the next three weeks, Nally con-
tinued to see a psychiatrist, two other general practitioners and two
mental health professionals.2 8 After Nally's girlfriend rejected his mar-
riage proposal and after an argument with his family, Nally went to a
friend's apartment and fatally shot himself.29
After a four-week trial, 0 the judge granted a nonsuit on the basis
19. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, -, 763 P.2d
948, 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
24. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Nally's parents actually asked the attending'physician to inform other per-
sons that Nally was being treated for pneumonia rather than attempted suicide. The
Nallys also rejected two attempts by their son's doctors to get consent for involuntary
commitment. See id.
28. See id. at -, 763 P.2d at 951-52, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100-01. One of the church's
pastors arranged an appointment with one of the physicians and also encouraged Nally
to see another psychiatrist. Id. In addition to Nally's original psychiatrist, Nally also saw
a psychologist and a state registered psychologist's assistant. Id. None of these "counsel-
ors" were named as defendants, even though each failed to initiate involuntary commit-
ment procedures.
29. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
30. After the complaint was entered, the trial court granted the defendant's motion
[Vol. 41
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of the defendant's first amendment defense.3 1 On appeal, a divided
court rejected the defense, however, and recognized a new cause of ac-
tion, "negligent failure to prevent suicide" by a non-therapist coun-
selor, holding that when a special counseling relationship exists, the
counselor has the duty to refer counselees to mental health profession-
als.32 Moreover, if the suicidal counselee resists psychiatric care, the
referral duty may go beyond merely recommending that the counselee
see a psychiatrist to notifying mental health authorities.33 In a sharp
dissent, Justice Cole criticized the majority for creating the new tort.
34
In addition to criticizing the vague standards established for the tort,
Justice Cole asserted that the majority's decision violated the first
amendment because no compelling state interest justified its intrusion
into the religious arena.35
The California Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of
appeal's decision.36 The supreme court, however, based its decision on
tort principles and declined to address the constitutional issues.37 Five
justices asserted that pastors have no legal duty to protect counselees
under traditional tort principles: "[Olne is ordinarily not liable for the
actions of another . . . in the absence of a special relationship of cus-
tody or control. 38 Since the court was unwilling to recognize religious
counseling as a "special relationship," it found that the pastors had
owed no legal duty to Nally or his parents.39 The court also noted that
for summary judgment. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 953, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102. On appeal, a
divided panel reversed the summary judgment order on the basis of the third cause of
action. Id. The California Supreme Court, however, while denying review, de-certified
the court of appeal's decision and remanded the case for trial. Id.
31. See id. at -, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
32. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 227 (Ct.
App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
33. Id. at 227-29.
34. See id. at 243-49 (Cole, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 245-46 (Cole, J., dissenting).
36. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, ., 763
P.2d 948, 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
37. The court did note that even if "workable standards of care could be estab-
lished . . . quite possibly [it would be] unconstitutional to impose a duty of care on
pastoral counselors." Id. at _, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
38. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
39. See id. at -, 763 P.2d at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105-07. Although two prior
cases in California had held that a professional therapist has an affirmative duty to pre-
vent foreseeable suicides by counselees, see Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445
P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, 67
Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967), the supreme court was unwilling to
extend the rule to include nontherapists. The court noted that both cases involved a
strictly supervised medical relationship in which the "defendants failed to take precau-
tions to prevent the patient's suicide even though the medical staff in charge of the pa-
1990]
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imposing liability on nonprofessional counselors would thwart the im-
portant social policy of encouraging private counseling services." The
court deferred to the legislature's wisdom in deciding that "access to
the clergy for counseling should be free from state imposed counseling
standards .... -41 Justice Kaufman, in his concurrence, argued that
while clergy owe a duty of care to counselees, the pastors in Nally had
met the duty by referring Nally to other professionals.
42
Even though the court of appeal's decision in Nally ultimately was
reversed, the decision signaled the beginning of clerical counseling mal-
practice suits and prompted extensive scholarly debate. 43 Nevertheless,
because of the unique nature of the cause of action, most writers have
analyzed the tort conceptually44 and have only discussed the constitu-
tional issues briefly. 5 Accordingly, this note will deal exclusively with
tient's care knew that the patient was likely to attempt to take his own life." Nally, 47
Cal. 3d at -, 763 P.2d at 956-57, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06. Accordingly, the court limited
these cases to professional psychiatric malpractice, concluding that no special relation-
ship existed between Nally and the pastors. Id. at , 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at
107.
The finding of no "special relationship" also insulates counselors from liability im-
posed under Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In Tarasoff a therapist was held to have a duty to warn third
persons of potential attacks by counselees. Liability was imposed in Tarasoff because of
the "special relationship" between the counselee and therapist. The Nally court, how-
ever, refused to recognize the existence of a special relationship between a clergy coun-
selor and a counselee. Accordingly, in California, nontherapist pastoral counselors owe no
legal duty to counselees or third persons connected to counselees.
10. See Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at -, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
41. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
42. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 967, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
43. See Esbeck, supra note 1, at 79 nn.480-81.
44. As may be expected, commentators vehemently disagree on the feasibility of
applying professional malpractice concepts to clerical counseling. Although each article
on clergy malpractice argues the issue differently, the arguments generally spring from
two seminal articles discussing the application of malpractice concepts to counseling.
Compare Ericsson, supra note 13, at 169-73 (contending that civil courts are unable to
identify the scope and nature of counseling, to differentiate between duty owed based on
training and level of ecclesiastical office, to set objective standards to review spiritual
training, and to regulate the content of a counseling session) with Bergman, supra note
9, at 59-62 (arguing that duty for clerical counseling is defined by the state of the art of
professional health care personnel, and clergy are, therefore, under the same duty as any
other "professional counselor.").
The case law, however, uniformly has recognized the inherent difficulties of estab-
lishing workable tort standards for clergy malpractice. See supra cases cited note 15.
45. But see Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the
Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 507 (1983) (arguing that liability for
counseling is unconstitutional). Although this article presents a solid doctrinal defense, it
provides only a limited analysis of several key constitutional issues and of the public
policy considerations involved, and has, at least in part, been superseded by recent cases.
[Vol. 41
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the constitutional implications of the tort of clergy malpractice under
both the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Protections guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion are foremost among our civil rights.4" Fundamental to this amnend-
ment is the freedom of religion provided by the establishment and free
exercise clauses.47 Rarely, however, can an individual invoke both
clauses in support of a religious position because of the inherent "con-
flict" between the concepts.48 In fact, the clauses frequently are pitted
against each other, since free exercise claims of one religious group are
often disavowed as establishments of religion by government or other
religious denominations.4  Despite the paradoxical nature of the
clauses, however, both protect religious autonomy: the establishment
clause prevents government from sponsoring a favorite religion, and
the free exercise clause prevents government from coercing an individ-
ual to violate his conscience or alter his beliefs.
Clergy malpractice presents a unique constitutional question be-
cause both clauses must be analyzed to determine the constitutionality
of the tort.50 The government may violate the free exercise clause by
46. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (first amendment free-
doms are in preferred position among constitutional guarantees).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."); see also Pfeffer, The
Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115, 1142 (1973) (free exercise clause is the
favored child of the first amendment).
48. See 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.1 (1986) (noting natural antagonism between two
clauses).
49. Consider, for example, a school system in which one group of parents desires a
time of prayer for children, and another group of parents opposes the idea. Although the
parents urging the prayer time claim free exercise rights, the parents opposing the time
of prayer claim it would be an establishment of state religion. See Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer composed by school officials and voluntarily recited by students
was unconstitutional establishment of religion); accord Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (officially sponsored Bible reading and recitation of Lord's
Prayer unconstitutional establishment of religion); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (parents tried
unsuccessfully to invoke the free exercise clause to force local school board to remove
textbooks they considered inimical to their religious beliefs).
50. Although dividing the constitutional arguments between the establishment and
free exercise clauses helps to analyze the problem, the dichotomy represents a simplistic
view of the issue. The issue of religious autonomy could be argued as an independent
concept without the free exercise or establishment labels. Authorities in the first amend-
ment area have recognized that the line between the establishment and free exercise
1990]
7
Lehman: Clergy Malpractice: A onstitutional Approach
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
coercing clergy or by punishing them for following the dictates of their
faith,51 or it may violate the establishment clause by becoming "entan-
gled" with religion.52
A. Does Clerical Counseling Constitute a Valid Religious Interest
Under The First Amendment?
1. What are the limits of judicial inquiry into religious belief?.
Obviously, an activity must be religious before the practitioner can
invoke the protection of the first amendment.5 3 The Supreme Court,
however, has struggled with formulating an appropriate definition of
religion. 4 As a result, instead of setting limits on religious beliefs, the
Court generally defers to an individual's interpretation of his or her
own religion in all cases except when the practice is "so bizarre, so
clearly nonreligious in motivation as not to be entitled to protection.'15
clause is blurred. See, e.g., Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 821-22 (1984) (noting that many religious is-
sues can be argued under either religious clause depending on the individual interpreta-
tion and preference). Compare Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1378-94 (1981) (arguing that the free exercise clause covers religious
autonomy) with Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984) (arguing that the es-
tablishment clause covers religious autonomy).
51. See infra notes 100-69 and accompanying text (discussing possible violations of
the free exercise clause).
52. See infra notes 170-208 and accompanying text (discussing possible violations
of the establishment clause).
53. Although the religious interest threshold applies primarily to the free exercise
clause, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (Amish had to show
compulsory school attendance at odds with fundamental tenants of religious beliefs
before invoking the free exercise clause), this issue also is fundamental to any establish-
ment clause analysis. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (primary effect
of government action must be one neither advancing nor inhibiting religion). Of course,
if the activity has nothing to do with religious dictates, the first amendment shield does
not apply to religious leaders or groups.
54. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (since religion not
defined in Constitution must look to historical intent of framers) with United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (courts do not have the authority to define religion). For a
general discussion of judicial attempts to define religion, see M. KONvITz, RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY AND CONSCIENCE-A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY, 27-50 (1968); Freeman, The Mis-
guided Search for the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 71 GEo. L.J. 1519 (1983);
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Ball,
What is Religion?, 8 Christian Lawyer 7 (1979); Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A
First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEY. L. REV. 139 (1982).
55. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
(1981). Although the Supreme Court has never determined what religious conduct would
[Vol. 41
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Even in these unusual cases, the Court strictly construes judicial au-
thority to inquire into the validity of any religious belief or practice.58
In United States v. Ballard57 the Supreme Court held that in civil
cases courts cannot inquire into the truth or falsity of an individual's
belief.58 In the majority opinion Justice Douglas eloquently declared:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put tG the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may
be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made
suspect before the law.. . . If one could be sent to jail because a jury
in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed
would be left of religious freedom. . . . [Some] religious views . . .
might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if
those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they
enter a forbidden domain."9
Even though subsequent decisions recognize that in some cases indi-
viduals must prove that their religious beliefs and practices are sin-
cerely held, the Court continues to avoid determining the validity of
the belief.60
not be protected under this standard, lower courts suggest a few examples. In Strock v.
Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1988), the court held that a minis-
ter's sexual affair with his counselee was "non-religious in motivation-a bizarre devia-
tion from normal spiritual counseling practices of ministers ...... Therefore, the minis-
ter was not protected by the first amendment and was subject to civil liability.
It is foreseeable that some fringe religious sects might actually accept and condone
sexual affairs with counselees as a common religious practice. But even if the practice
were religious, the minister could still be punished if the conduct were criminal. See
infra note 98 and accompanying text (religious activity violating criminal law not pro-
tected). Similarly, the minister could be punished if his conduct could be characterized
as an intentional tort. See supra note 8.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
57. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). The Ballards, founders of the "I Am" movement, claimed to
have supernatural powers to heal incurable diseases. Part of their "ministry" involved
soliciting financial support through the mail. Accordingly, they were indicted in federal
district court for mail fraud. See id. at 79-80.
58. Id. at 86.
59. Id. at 86-87.
60. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (Amish had to prove
sincerity of belief). The most significant "sincerity" cases arose from the Vietnam draft.
To object to conscription, the court held that an individual had to prove the sincerity of
his religious beliefs. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality
opinion); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). But see Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (civil court unable to determine sincerity of beliefs, since sincer-
ity cannot be divorced from verity of doctrine); Ericsson, supra note 13, at 180 (arguing
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Based on the principle of religious autonomy posited in Ballard,
the Court has implemented additional restraints on inquiry into reli-
gion. In United States v. Lee"1 the Court reasoned that in civil cases
courts cannot determine the centrality or importance of beliefs, since
courts are not "'arbiters of scriptural interpretation.' "62 The Court
has even gone so far as to hold that "religious beliefs need not be ac-
ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection."6 3 Nevertheless, individuals will
have to prove that their beliefs are "rooted in religion" rather than
philosophy, since "[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable may
not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation. . if it is
based on purely secular considerations .... ,,84 For this reason, as long
as a belief is sincerely held, it does not have to be "fundamental" or
believable to warrant full constitutional protection.
2. Is Clergy Counseling a Religious Activity?
Clearly, clergy perform some acts that are uniquely religious, 65 and
some acts that are wholly secular.66 Whether clerical counseling is in-
herently religious or primarily secqlar, however, is a matter of dis-
pute. 7 Many clergy68 believe that "pastoral counseling specifically in-
volves the application of religious insights into day to day problems
that the modern Court might adopt Jackson's view in light of the expanded definition of
"religion" for free exercise purposes). The argument, however, may be moot since the
court's sincerity test has shifted from a "test of what a person believes ... [to a test of]
whether one really believes it, a 'fervency test.'" Esbeck, supra note 50, at 397.
61. 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (objection by Amish to payment of social security tax on
religious grounds).
62. Id. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
63. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
64. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
65. See supra text accompanying note 9.
66. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing clergy's liability for non-
religious activities).
67. Compare Ericsson, supra note 13, at 166-67 (cannot separate "cure of the
minds" from "cure of the soul") with Bergman, supra note 9, at 57-59 (clergy counseling
has become "secularized").
68. This Note assumes a religious viewpoint similar to that of the pastors' in the
Nally case. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. Regardless of the popularity of
this viewpoint among religious counselors, it is nevertheless an appropriate starting
point. First, it is impossible to give an accurate unified exposition of all religious counsel-
ors' beliefs and convictions. More importantly, any constitutional analysis of clergy mal-
practice should consider the most favorable constitutional case for the clergy. If, in spite
of a pastor's sincerely held religious belief that all counseling is spiritual, a court con-
cludes that spiritual counseling is not a constitutionally protected activity, then the fate
of those pastors who disagree with the pastors in Nally would already be decided.
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such as difficulties in marriage, parenthood, employment, and other re-
lationships ... ."I Accordingly, those who argue that counseling is re-
ligious accept the clergy's perception of counseling and contend that
government cannot objectively determine the validity of the religious
belief.7 On the other hand, those who argue that counseling is secular
claim to look at the issue objectively by comparing counseling to psy-
chotherapy.21 The former view, however, more accurately reflects the
strict constitutional limits traditionally imposed on judicial inquiry
into religious belief.7 2 If spiritual counseling is not considered religious,
courts would be required to question the validity of a pastor's religious
claim by attempting to separate the spirftual elements of the counsel-
ing from the purely psychological.7 3 Facing this type of situation in
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,74 the Oregon Court of Appeals
stated that although some of the religious instruction appeared "more
psychological than religious, [it could not] dissect the body of beliefs
into individual components."'75 Clearly, "it is no business of courts to
say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not
religion under the protection of the First Amendment.!" Therefore,
assuming members of the clergy can demonstrate their beliefs are sin-
69. Note, Clergy Malpractice: Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action
for Improper Counseling by a Clergyman?, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 223, 229 (1987).
70. See Ericsson, supra note 13, at 183 (beyond civil court's authority to object to
one system of religious belief even if the practice is out of step with accepted psychologi-
cal custom).
71. See Bergman, supra note 9, at 59-62 (clergy's duty should be defined by state
of the art in the psychiatric profession).
72. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (courts cannot determine valid-
ity of a belief and cannot dissect a system of belief).
73. In addition to the constitutional problems with such an inquiry, a court would
face great practical difficulties in making this distinction. Even expert psychologists are
unwilling to tackle this problem. For example, when asked where spirituality left off and
psychology began, one of the plaintiff's experts in the Nally case responded, "'Well, I
don't think Jesus Christ would touch that one. . . . There's no answer to such a ques-
tion. They are intermingled."' Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215, 246 (Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal),
rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644
(1989).
74. 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982) (plaintiff sued for fraud and mind control
after the church pastor promised to raise her I.Q. but failed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
75. Id. at 241, 644 P.2d at 601.
76. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). Those who reject this position
generally are concerned for the interests of consumers because counselees are potentially
vulnerable to "quacky" ideologies and gimmicks. Society, however, accepts great risks in
giving such broad protections to destructive speech and unusual religions in order to
maintain freedom for all. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note
48, § 20.6 (discussing value of free speech).
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cere, they should avoid liability by asserting a valid religious interest,
regardless of secular evaluations of the counseling as nonreligious."
7
Clergy who believe all counseling is inherently religious can pro-
pound cogent arguments to support their claims. Historically, pastoral
counseling has been recognized as "the oldest form of psychother-
apy, '7 8 being traced back to Biblical times. 9 Thus, counseling parishio-
ners on diverse matters has always been inextricably linked to tradi-
tional pastoral duties.
Many commentators attribute the birth of modern psychology to
the pastoral counseling movement and argue that all counseling,
whether given by a religious leader or secular psychologist, is spiritual
in content.80 In fact the founders of modern psychology acknowledged
the spiritual nature of counseling:
Freud directly acknowledged the essential similarity between psycho-
analytic therapy and religious counseling by describing psychoanalysis
as "pastoral work in the best sense of the words." He thus recognized
in psychoanalysis what is true of all psychotherapy and counseling;
namely that it is similar, and indeed a rival, to the long Christian tra-
dition of confession and counseling.
... Jung also was quite aware of the religious nature of psycho-
therapy ... [as illustrated] when he writes: "patients force a psycho-
therapist into the role of priest, and expect and demand that he shall
free them from distress. That is why we psychotherapists must occupy
ourselves with problems which strictly speaking belong to the
theologian."81
77. Of course, admitting that an activity is religious does not grant the actor an
absolute shield from liability; the pastor must also prove the religious interest of the
activity outweighs any countervailing societal interest. See infra note 106 and accompa-
nying text (balancing process under the religion clauses). Accordingly, critics should fo-
cus on the balancing process and argue that state interests justify imposing a burden on
religion, rather than merely dismissing a pastor's claim to religious freedom based on the
critics' own objective evaluations of the activity.
78. C. STEIN, PRACTICAL PASTORAL COUNSELING vii (1970).
79. See C. KEMP, PHYSICIANS OF THE SOUL: A HISTORY OF PASTORAL COUNSELING 3
(1947).
80. See, e.g., J. ADAMS, THE CHRISTIAN COUNSELOR'S MANUAL 9 (1973). Adams ar-
gues that psychiatrists invade a sphere reserved for ministers, especially since the goal of
both are identical-to change behavior, emotions, and character through value, attitude
and behavioral change. He sees a psychiatrist as "part physician ... and part secular
priest ... [who] serve[s] the host of persons who previously were counseled by ministers
... ." Id. Accordingly, Adams suggests that psychiatrists should return to the practice
of medicine and leave the spiritual guidance to ministers. Id. at 10.
81. Vitz, Psychology as Religion, in BAKER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 932, 933-
34 (D. Benner ed. 1985) (citations omitted); see also P. VITZ, PSYCHOLOGY As RELIGION:
THE CULT OF SELF-WORSHIP (1977) (arguing that psychology has become a form of secu-
lar humanism based on self-worship); Szaaz, The Theology of Therapy: The Breach of
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Consequently, even though psychologists and psychiatrists have "secu-
larized" traditional pastoral counseling, clergy logically could view
counseling as the spiritual application of religious doctrine.
The clergy's strongest argument that counseling is spiritual, how-
ever, is not based in history or on admissions by secular mental health
professionals. Instead, it is based on the clergy's individual religious
convictions. Some clergy believe that religion permeates and influences
every part of a believer's life and consequently reject any attempt to
separate an individual's "secular activities" from "sacred activities."
Such religious presuppositions naturally dictate a theocentric counsel-
ing philosophy.s 2 Several conclusions arguably flow from this philoso-
phy. First, assuming a problem does not stem from an organic illness
such as a chemical imbalance, 3 it should have a spiritual solution, re-
gardless of its nature.8 4 Second, a spiritual counselor seeks to help the
counselee deal with everyday problems through confession of sin,
prayer, and spiritual growth 5 Finally once a person re-establishes a
relationship with God, the emotional problems, including depression,
anxiety, and guilt, should be alleviated."6 Based on these spiritual con-
victions, pastors can logically and consistently claim that counseling is
inherently religious.
Pastors in the Nally case taught "a thoroughly biblical message
and world view, believing that the Bible is the divinely inspired Word
of God containing the truths that must govern Christians in their rela-
tionship with the Almighty, with the world at large, and in their own
personal lives. 1 7 Furthermore, the counselors employed Biblical in-
struction as well as prayer and guidance in counseling sessions.88 The
pastors disclaimed any pretense of professional or clinical counseling,
since the focus of the church's counseling program was on a "spiritual
• .. and a biblical level."8' 9 Arguably, such a counseling philosophy
springs from religious conviction and constitutes a valid religious
the First Amendment Through the Medicalization of Morals, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 127 (1975) (arguing that liberty of modern Americans is threatened by propen-
sity to seek comfort through submission to religious or secular institutions, which in
terms of psychiatry generally are the same thing).
82. See J. ADAMS, supra note 80, at 11.
83. Since a pastor should not be treating physical disorders, the pastor should work
closely with medical doctors in certain cases.
84. See J. ADAMS, supra note 80, at 9 (scriptures only specify three sources of per-
sonal problems: demonic activity, sin, and organic illness).
85. Id. at 115-37.
86. Id. at 348-82.
87. Brief of Respondent at 3, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47
Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
88. Id.
89. Id. n.3.
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3. What is the Scope of Constitutional Protection?
Although the beliefs espoused by the pastors in Nally may seem
extreme, 1 such a perception does not diminish the constitutional pro-
tection granted to those who adhere to this religious philosophy.92 First
amendment protection does not hinge on the truth or falsity or even
the reasonableness of belief.93 As long as clergy establish that their
counseling is grounded in their religion, they assert a valid religious
interest.
0 4
Of course, outrageous conduct does not warrant the same constitu-
tional protection as outrageous speech. 5 In addition to the wholly non-
religious acts for which a minister may be held liable, 8 there may be a
90. Even though the court of appeals would have held the pastors liable, the court
never questioned the validity or sincerity of their beliefs. See Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215
(Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d
278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
91. Some clergy criticized this religious approach. See J. HIELEMA, PASTORAL -OR
CHRISTIAN COUNSELING 6-7 (1975) (criticizing J. Adams' structural approach). On the
other hand, several noted secular scholars have partially embraced this counseling ap-
proach. See W. GLASSER, REALITY THERAPY (1965); P. LONDON, THE MODES AND MORALS
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 153 (1964).
92. Since religious speech is entitled to the same protection as political speech, see
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the outrageousness of the speech does not viti-
ate the first amendment protection accorded to it; cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988) (outrageousness of lewd parody does not pierce first amendment shield).
Similarly, any intentional tort claim against a pastor based on the content of the reli-
gious message (e.g., intentional infliction of emotional distress) faces a heavy presump-
tion of invalidity. At the very least, a plaintiff would have to show constitutional malice
by clear and convincing evidence under the standard established in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 197 Cal. App. 3d
363, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1987) (court applied New York Times constitutional malice
standard when former church member sued pastors of church for defamation and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); see generally, Note, First Amendment Limits on
Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749 (1985) (tort liability used to regulate ideas goes to the essence of the first
amendment).
93. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
94. Of course, those counselors who do not claim that certain counseling practices
are religiously motivated are not constitutionally protected, even though the same prac-
tice would be covered if espoused as a religious belief, since religion depends on an indi-
vidual's own perception. Id.
95. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing different levels of
protection granted to beliefs as opposed to religious practices).
96. As established, a minister is liable for negligence in "secular" activities and for
those intentional torts committed in a religious context but not motivated by a religious
belief, such as a sexual affair with a counselee in a religious counseling session. See supra
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narrow spectrum of religious conduct so bizarre as not to warrant first
amendment protection. 7 Criminal activities-such as religious sacri-
fices or mass congregational suicides-conducted in the name of reli-
gion may presumptively fall outside the scope of the first amend-
ment 8 Nevertheless, the activities of the pastors in Nally did not rise
to this level of outrageousness. Furthermore, if a classification is based
on the content of the speech, as in pastoral counseling, pastors or reli-
gious institutions invoke the plenary protection of the first amend-
ment.99 Thus, before recognizing clergy malpractice as a cause of ac-
tion, courts must conclude that the tort passes constitutional muster
under traditional free exercise clause and establishment clause
analyses.
B. Free Exercise Clause
1. Distinction Between Religious Belief and Religious Practice
The first amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. 1 °0
Although couched in absolute terms, this constitutional guarantee has
never been interpreted as creating an absolute shield for every relig-
iously motivated act. Rather, the limits of religious freedom depend on
notes 7-8.
97. See supra note 55.
98. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (stating in dicta that a
religious sacrifice could not seriously be considered a protected religious practice).
Rather than creating a per se category of invalid religious claims, modern courts proba-
bly would apply the standard balancing test. Nevertheless, since the interest in protect-
ing life is so great, the religious interest would not be considered constitutionally
significant.
Similarly, religious "counsel" instructing a counselee to kill another or to commit
suicide would not be protected as an exercise of freedom of religion. The counselor would
be an accessory to the crime and would be criminally liable, just as he would be civilly
liable for any intentional tort. See generally Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Sui-
cide, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 348 (1986) (discussing criminal liability of persons who assist or
encourage suicide). Thus, this note assumes that the counseling given will not violate
criminal law or amount to an intentional tort. See supra notes 7-13.
99. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc., 819 F.2d 875,
880 (9th Cir.) (addressing a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
pastor of a church, the court held that when the "imposition of liability would result in
the abridgement of the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, recovery in tort is
barred"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) (state tort law cannot circumvent first amendment).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I (generally referred to as the "free exercise clause). The
free exercise clause was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (inferential incorporation) and Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (explicit incorporation).
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whether governmental interference affects a religious belief or religious
conduct.101 "The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the sec-
ond cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protec-
tion of society. 1 0 2 Indeed, "the very concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has inportant interests."'0 3 To
avoid emasculating this right, however, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently maintained strict criteria for reviewing government regulation of
religious conduct.104 Once individuals establish that government action
burdens the practice of their religion, 0 5 the government must show
that the regulation is the least restrictive means of accomplishing a
compelling state interest. 0 6
2. Burden Imposed on Free Exercise by Tort Liability
Before the government is required to justify its action, individuals
must prove the proposed regulation burdens their religious practices. 10 7
The government action must coerce individuals to act contrary to their
beliefs rather than merely offend their religious sensibilities. 0 8 "Never
101. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
102. Id.
103. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
104. This paper assumes without argument that spiritual counseling constitutes reli-
gious conduct rather than mere belief. But see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631 n.2
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] sharp distinction cannot be made between reli-
gious beliefs and religiously motivated action ... ."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
536 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("There can be no true freedom of mind if thoughts
are secure only when they are pent up."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940) (court distinguished conduct from religious communications).
105. The test assumes the practice is based on religious dictates and not mere philo-
sophical preferences. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
106. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); see also
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (gov-
ernment must exercise least restrictive means to accomplish compelling state interest);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance" free exercise claims); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S, 296, 304 (1940) (government must show "permissible" objective with-
out unduly infringing on religion); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (government
regulation infringing on religious freedoms can regulate acts threatening social order or
morality); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (government may regulate
overt acts against peace and good order).
107. This constitutional threshold has been required since first explicitly stated in
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), in which the Court held that
one claiming the burden to one's religious practices must show the coercive effect of the
government action. Id. at 223.
108. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453
(1988). This distinction is grounded in sound public policy. If the government were re-
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. . . has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the
Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will
further his or her spiritual development. .. ."I" Thus, "the Free Ex-
ercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to
the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from gov-
ernment." '10 Individuals can only invoke the protection of the free ex-
ercise clause to avoid two types of governmental activity: governmental
dictates that compel citizens to violate their religious beliefs;"" and
governmental regulations that indirectly coerce persons, or at least pe-
nalize them for holding to their religious tenets.1 2 Thus, clergy must
prove that tort liability for spiritual counseling will directly or indi-
rectly burden their religious beliefs or practices in order to escape
liability.
Clergy may be able to show several specific areas in which tort
liability would burden their religious practices. For example, liability
could undercut religious autonomy by establishing a de facto ortho-
doxy that punishes ministers for failing to conform to accepted state
standards. Clergy would therefore be held liable for malpractice for
failing to instruct counselees in certain areas and not avoiding
others." 3 But the first amendment protects "both the right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures
the right to proselytize religious . . . causes must also guarantee the
concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." 14 By promoting
quired to act so as to avoid offending an individual's religious or moral standards, the
government would be powerless. Individuals should not be able to dictate the action of
the majority. On the other hand, the government should be prevented from dictating an
individual's religious beliefs. Thus, any government action against such beliefs must be
analyzed under the free exercise clause.
109. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (emphasis in original).
110. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
111. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military dress code required
Orthodox Jews to violate religious practice of wearing yarmulke); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandatory school attendance law unconstitutionally violated
Amish's religious conviction of keeping children from attending public school beyond
eighth grade).
112. E.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (state
violated Seventh Day Adventist's free exercise rights by denying unemployment compen-
sation benefits to individuals who refused to work on Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to
Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in munitions factory on basis of religion held
unconstitutional); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (unconstitutional to deny unemployment bene-
fits to individual because of individual's refusal to work on Sabbath).
113. E.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct.
App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
114. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977); see also West Virginia Bd. of
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religious orthodoxy, clergy malpractice inevitably would curtail the
church's right to choose which doctrines to implement.'1 "
Beyond the impact on freedom of religious practice, religious au-
tonomy could be restricted in other ways. Quite possibly, clergy could
be forced to accept and practice an ideological viewpoint that "they
find morally objectionable." 116 For exampl6, the minimum standards
for clergy malpractice as articulated in Nalty would require clergy to
refer suicidal counselees to mental health professionals." 7 One of the
pastors in Nally, however, believed he should not refer counselees to
secular psychotherapists because of the psychotherapist's "world
view."" 8 No doubt, this pastor believed he should protect his par-
ishoners "from counsel that may undermine their faith," since he may
not have been able to find a professional counselor "supportive of the
doctrinal stance of the church. . . [No legal duty should] require
clergy to refer their troubled members to professionals who may, in
fact, be hostile to the members' faith.""' 9
Moreover, the establishment of a comprehensive standard of care
most likely would require ministers to participate in a minimum
amount of training and to utilize established testing and diagnostic
programs."2 0 If a pastor believed that certain psychological tests were
based on nonreligious philosophies, any attempt to force the pastor to
use those tests could "burden" the pastor's religious practices.' 2 '
The burdens that clergy malpractice would place on religious au-
tonomy could chill spiritual counseling activity. Just as medical doctors
are limiting their practice because of the fear and cost of the medical
malpractice crisis,"2 2 clergy would be motivated to limit counseling ser-
vices as well. A minister would be required "to predict which of its
activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a
bright one, and an organization might understandably be convinced
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (freedom of religion may only be infringed upon
to prevent grave and immediate danger to legitimate state interest).
115. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (state's practice of providing
teachers for parochial schools, necessitating that the state provide controlling surveil-
lance of the teachers so that they separated their secular teaching from religious beliefs,
involved excessive entanglement between church and state).
116. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (New Hampshire could not require drivers to display
motto, "Live Free or Die," on license tags if drivers found the slogan objectionable on
religious grounds).
117. See Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (opinion deleted from official reporter after rever-
sal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644.
118. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 245 n.6 (Cole, J., dissenting).
119. Ericsson, supra note 13, at 175.
120. See Bergman, supra note 9, at 59-60.
121. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
122. See Malpractice Suits: Doctors Under Siege, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 62.
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that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mis-
sion."'12 3 Thus, the threat of litigation could color every pastoral coun-
seling situation.
Liability for negligent counseling may require some counselors to
discontinue pastoral counseling altogether. 24 Ideally, the possibility of
litigation should not discourage pastors. Nevertheless, some may be
forced out of counseling because of the potential costs. Even if suits
were meritless, clergy, who generally live on modest budgets, could not
afford costly legal battles.1 5 Although malpractice insurance would re-
duce a pastor's financial exposure," 6 some counselors might object to
obtaining coverage because of the potential conflict of interest with the
clergy-penitent privilege.
12 7
Even for those counselors who would choose to face the malprac-
tice risks, the threat of litigation would inevitably affect the counseling
relationship. Risk of liability could cause some counselors to "avoid
moral confrontation""' in order to "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone.""129 Thus, when a parishioner might be in the greatest need of
honest evaluation, a pastor would be tempted to respond with innocu-
ous advice in order to avoid conflict.
Such liability would also tend to erect barriers between counselors
and counselees. Because ministers, like other counselors, are ethically
bound to preserve the confidences of counseling relationships, coun-
123. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
124. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct.
App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
125. For example, in Nally the litigation lasted almost nine years and included a
Motion for Summary Judgment, a four week trial, three appellate judgments and an
application for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
126. See Note, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power,
14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137, 154 (1986) (arguing insurance inexpensive and highly cost,
effective). The author notes that "[i]n 1984, $300,000.00 worth of liability coverage cost
the average members of the clergy about $25.00 per year.. . . [T]he reason the premium
was so low was that the insurer does not expect to pay any verdicts. The real expense
would be only in the area of legal fees associated with providing a defense." Id. at 154
n.99 (citations omitted). But see Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Council of Churches
at 46 n.6, Nally, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (giving example of
church that was forced to consider terminating its counseling program after insurance
rates increased to $12,400 per year to cover the counseling ministry).
127. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
128. See Note, supra note 12, at 1309.
129. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (when free speech is involved, due
process requires the state to prove that the defendant engaged in criminal speech); First
Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angele", 357 U.S. 545 (1958) (adapting Speiser to
religious context).
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selees trust their spiritual counselors. 130 If, however, clergy members
were held liable for malpractice, a pastor would be required to refer
any suicidal or "dangerous" counselees to mental-health professionals.
Thus, a counselor would face conflicting duties: a legal duty to refer
the counselee, and an ethical duty to remain silent."' Resolution of
this conflict might pressure a member of the clergy to disclose confi-
dential discussions to the counselee's family or others."32 Further, po-
tential disclosure could cause the counselee to withdraw and distrust
the counselor, especially if the counselee had come to the minister to
avoid the stigma often associated with seeing mental health profession-
als. 133 The risk of depression, alienation or even suicide might even in-
crease if the counselee chose not to see the minister out of fear that the
minister would reveal the counselee's problem to a third party. 3 4
Thus, the threat of liability for clergy malpractice could affect every
aspect of the counseling relationship and could chill efforts to aid those
in need of guidance.
Clergy malpractice has an inherently coercive effect on spiritual
counseling. While tort liability will not prohibit the free exercise of any
religious practice, tort liability for spiritual counselors would deter reli-
gious exercise just as subsequent punishment effectively deters free
speech. As the Supreme Court stated in Thomas v. Review Board:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit
130. For a general discussion of the priest penitent privilege and its effect on clergy-
parishioner relationships, see Mitchell, Must the Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements Versus The Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 723 (1987); Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent
Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PiTt. L. REV. 27 (1967) and
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983).
131. Ministers may also be forced to break a confidence in order to cooperate with
insurance companies if any suit were ever filed. See Ericsson, supra note 13, at 174. But
see Note, supra note 126, at 155. The author of the student note asserts this contention
is specious, since privilege is legally waived at institution of lawsuit. The author, how-
ever, ignores the possibility that a minister might feel ethically obligated to remain silent
despite the legal waiver of the privilege.
132. See Ericsson, supra note 13, at 174.
133. The Nally case supports this conclusion. Nally's parents sought to avoid the
stigma of their son having been to a psychiatrist and especially a mental hospital. See
supra note 27; see also infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (many distressed peo-
ple who will see a minister for counseling will not go to a psychiatrist).
134. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, , 763
P.2d 948, 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109 (1988) (" '[D]uty to refer' . . . could deter those
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that their private disclosures
could subject them to involuntary commitment to psychiatric facilities."), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
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because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting sub-
stantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may
be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial." 5
The burden placed on religious practice by the tort of clergy malprac-
tice, while possibly indirect, is "nonetheless substantial," and closely
tracks the rule of Thomas and an established line of Supreme Court
cases recognizing that the government may not punish an individual
forced to leave his job for religious reasons by denying unemployment
benefits. 136 Thus, the practical effect of liability for spiritual counseling
is that clergy are penalized for adhering to religious beliefs that do not
measure up to a government-approved standard of conduct."1
7
3. Government Interest in Clergy Malpractice
Assuming clergy malpractice burdens religious practice, the gov-
ernment must show a compelling state interest to justify imposing lia-
bility.13 Although the Supreme Court has found a compelling interest
in several recent free exercise cases, 1 9 the standard historically has
been difficult to meet in light of the requirement that the regulation be
the least restrictive means of achieving the goal. 140 Furthermore, if the
regulation does not provide a solution, or if there is a competing gov-
ernmental interest that can best be addressed in the absence of regula-
tion, the original governmental interest may not be deemed
135. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981).
136. See supra note 112 (detailing employment benefit cases).
137. Cf. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 881 (9th Cir.) ("Im-
posing tort liability for shunning on the Church or its members would in the long run
have the same effect as prohibiting the practice and would compel the Church to aban-
don part of its religious teachings."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
138. At least one commentator believes that Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, marked a shift
in the Supreme Court's free exercise test. Instead of balancing the burden with the as-
serted interest, the commentator suggests that the Court now simply looks to see if the
government has a compelling interest, regardless of the extent of the religious burden.
See Seeburger, Public Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
311 (1984). Nevertheless, other treatise writers believe that Thomas is merely an exten-
sion of Yoder. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 48, § 21.8, at 406. The
distinction, however, should be irrelevant with respect to clergy malpractice actions,
since under either interpretation, the government interest may not be compelling in light
of the social benefit of spiritual counseling. See infra notes 160-68.
139. E.g., Goldman v. Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military order); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (racial discrimination); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (social security fund).
140. See supra note 106.
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compelling.14 1
Proponents of tort liability for negligent counseling identify sev-
eral important governmental interests in regulating counseling rela-
tionships. First, the state has an important interest in preventing sui-
cides among mentally disturbed individuals, including those who seek
out pastoral counseling.142 In addition to the moral and social concerns,
society has a strong economic interest in saving lives and promoting
individual well-being, since many persons who commit suicide leave a
dependent family behind. Liability also would protect the public from
fringe religions and fraudulent schemes . 4 3 Finally, liability would pro-
tect innocent third persons, such as a counselee's spouse, from med-
dling and divisive clergy. 44 These concerns support the government's
interest in assuring counselor competency.
Undeniably, the government has a compelling interest in saving
lives."4 The government does not, however, have a compelling interest
in adopting every policy that purports to support the legitimate goal of
141, See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (state must prove exemption
for religious acts actually creates impediment to government goal); see also People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 724, 394 P.2d 813, 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (1964) ("[T]he state's
showing of 'compelling interest' cannot lie in untested assertions."); cf. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (state interest in imposing "gag order" on press
covering a criminal trial must be evaluated both in light of other measures mitigating the
effect of publicity as well as the effectiveness of a restraining order in preventing the
threatened danger).
142. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct.
App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989); see generally
Note, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander
Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1987) (detailing governmental
interest in preventing suicide).
143. See Bergman, supra note 9, at 56; see also Roney v. Yogi, 103 N.M. 89, 703
P.2d 186 (Ct. App.) (plaintiff sought spiritual guidance from cult leader who advised her
to undergo thirty day fast and then have her ovaries removed to solve her psychological
problems), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 62, 702 P.2d 1007 (1985); Christofferson v. Church of
Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982) (religious counselor fraudulently prom-
ised to raise intelligence level of counselee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1227 (1983).
144. See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (counselee
alleged minister defamed family, divulged counseling communications to church elders,
and alienated their children from parents and community).
145. The "snakehandler" cases, originating from state regulations preventing the
handling of poisonous snakes despite a certain religious sect's practices, represent exam-
ples of the government's interest in preserving life at the expense of religious practice.
See, e.g., Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v. Mas-
sey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina,
336 U.S. 942 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948); Kirk v. Com-
monwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947).
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preserving life or promoting mental health.14 6 Unless the policy actu-
ally solves the problem, the government interest in pursuing the policy
will not justify burdening religion.
14 7
For example, tort liability for spiritual counselors will do little to
prevent suicides. First, spiritual counselors rarely deal with suicidal
persons. 148 On those rare occasions, however, significant doubt exists as
to whether a psychotherapist can provide more efficacious counseling
than can a minister. Empirical studies confirm that mental health pro-
fessionals cannot accurately predict who will commit suicide or ade-
quately provide treatment for those considered to be at risk.149 There-
fore, in light of the limited success of mental health professionals, the
alternate approach of spiritual counseling may be preferable in some
cases. 5 ' Second, even if members of the clergy were required to notify
mental health professionals of suicidal counselees, actual commitment
of the counselee would be unlikely. For example, in Nally the parents
refused to commit their son, even at the request of his psychiatrist.'5 '
Furthermore, the psychiatrist declined to invoke involuntary commit-
ment procedures to avoid alienating Nally.' 5' Consequently, any legally
imposed duty to refer counselees will not necessarily accomplish the
governmental goal of preserving life without also requiring "mandatory
146. Some courts have questioned the importance of the state interest in protecting
the public from intangible emotional harm resulting from another's religious practices or
beliefs. See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.) (shun-
ning case), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 94-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (state had little interest in harm on the mental
or spiritual level); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (religious practice
only caused intangible emotional harm and thus did not pose a "clear and present men-
ace to public peace and order").
147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
148. See D. SWITZER, THE MINISTER As CRISIS COUNSELOR 35 (1974) (collecting stud-
ies indicating that more than 50% of all pastoral counselors never deal with suicidal
counselees and the remaining counselors deal with very few).
149. See Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide In Psychiatric Patients, 40 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 249 (1983) (explaining study of 4,800 patients, which concluded that identifi-
cation of particular persons who will commit suicide is not currently feasible).
150. See Murphy, On Suicide Prevention and Prediction, 40 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
343, 344 (1983) (Since suicide cannot be predicted with certainty, counseling "efforts
must be designed to relieve the substrate of despair that is the proximate basis for most
suicides. If we are successful in relieving that despair, our accomplishment is considera-
ble."); cf. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App.
1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal) (Cole, J. dissenting) (catelog-
ing California statutory authorities which recognize right of mentally disturbed persons
to rely on spiritual healing rather than medical or psychiatric treatment), rev'd, 47 Cal.
3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
151. Brief for Respondents at 7, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47
Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
152. Id. at 22, n.7.
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* , . involuntary confinement of all potentially suicidally inclined per-
sons." 153 As a result, the limited success of such drastic measures prob-
ably does not outweigh the heavy burden placed on the free expression
of religious beliefs.
1
5
4
The other asserted state interests also fail to justify burdening re-
ligious freedom. While fringe groups will inevitably proffer imprudent
religious counsel to vulnerable individuals, the nature of the first
amendment requires that our society grant protection to unpopular
and even deleterious ideas to preserve freedom for all. 15 Furthermore,
liability would not significantly add to protections against consumer
fraud, since legislatures already prevent ministers from holding them-
selves out as mental health professionals unless they are actually so
licensed.156 Additionally, since the vast majority of spiritual counselees
are parishioners rather than members of the general public, the state
interest is further reduced.157 Finally, a minister is already liable for
intentional torts.158 Thus, there are adequate protections against repre-
hensible social acts, as well as against interference with the family
unit. 50
153. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 246 n.8
(Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal) (Cole, J., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
154. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 246 n.8 (Cole, J., dissenting) (arguing that California
sometimes subordinates interest in citizens' lives to religious principles); see also Nor-
thrup v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 276, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1987) (court followed
state statute and allowed religious sect, whose religion precluded referrals to physicians,
to continue to use unlicensed midwives, even though during the course of three child
births two infants were stillborn).
155. See supra note 76.
156. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (discussing statutory exemptions
for ministers from licensure requirements).
Rabbi Bergman contends that with "mail order" ordination, liability is necessary to
protect the public. Bergman, supra note 9, at 55-56. State legislatures, however, have
already determined that ministers need not meet licensing requirements as long as they
do not hold themselves out as professionals, thus decreasing the likelihood of consumer
fraud. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if a minister chooses to become a mental health care profes-
sional, which includes state certification, he cannot avoid liability as a professional. In
such a case, the minister's religious interest is not reduced, but the state's interest in
protecting the public dramatically increases, since the minister would be in a position to
hold himself out to the public as approved by the state.
157. Balanced against religious interests, the state's interest is strongest when the
regulation protects citizens unassociated with the religion and weakest when the regula-
tion affects relations within the religious sect. See Note, supra note 12, at 1310-22 (dis-
cussing various government interests with regard to member and non-member plaintiffs).
158. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
159. In those jurisdictions which have abolished a tort of alienation of affections,
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Finally, the important societal benefits provided by spiritual coun-
seling may offset any harm caused by an irresponsible member of the
clergy. In counseling, clergy have several distinct advantages over li-
censed therapists: counselees generally know the pastor-counselor
before counseling begins, enhancing the likelihood that the counseling
relationship will be built on friendship and trust; counselees view the
minister without the stigma associated with seeing a psychologist, al-
lowing the counselor to avoid any fears the counselee may have about
psychiatry; counselees feel they can more easily approach clergy with
menial problems, giving the counselor the unique opportunity to pre-
vent small problems from growing; and counselees usually can seek
help from clergy twenty-four hours a day without financial cost, en-
couraging counselees to ask for help. 160 As a result, people tend to seek
out members of the clergy over mental health professionals.'6 1 This
natural tendency is encouraged by the burgeoning mental health crisis
and shrinking government appropriations for counseling centers.'
8 2
Thus, the benefits of any policy that discourages spiritual counselors,
such as liability for clergy malpractice, should be weighed carefully
against the loss of such services to the community. Indeed, the very
policies that support Good Samaritan laws encouraging voluntary and
private aid'"' argue against holding clerical counselors liable for
however, the family may have no legal recourse against a minister who disrupts spousal
relationships. Nevertheless, courts may still grant protection based on freedom of reli-
gion. See Radecki v. Schuckhardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 361 N.E.2d 543 (1976) (in ab-
sence of improper motives, religious groups can express relevant views, even if they tend
to cause disharmony); Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1969)
(constitutionally protected right to espouse religious views cannot be basis of claim for
alienation of affections). But see Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966)
(first amendment does not give minister right to interfere with family relationships).
160. See D. SWITZER, supra note 148, at 23; R. CAPLAN, HELPING THE HELPERS TO
HELP; MENTAL HEALTH CONSULTATION TO AID CLERGYMEN IN PASTORAL WORK 19-24
(1972).
161. See Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Bless-
ing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 219-21 (1985). The note cites a government
study which concluded that "in times of emotional or domestic trouble approximately
forty-two percent of individuals consult clergymen, twenty-nine percent seek help from
physicians, eighteen percent consult psychiatrists or psychologists, and ten percent turn
to clinics or other social agencies." Id. at 219 (citation omitted).
162. See D. SWITZER, supra note 148, at 33. The author notes: "In proportion to the
total population and to the number of persons in need, there is a decreasing percentage
of psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers and nurses. ...
[A]t least a partial answer to the increasing mental health needs is the clergy." Id.
163. Good Samaritan statutes bar the imposition of ordinary negligence liability on
one who aids another in an emergency. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 50086 (West 1983)
(exempting from liability first aid volunteers summoned by authorities to assist in search
or rescue operations); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 1799.102 (West Supp. 1989) (ex-
empting from liability nonprofessional persons giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation).
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malpractice. 16'
Many state legislatures have accepted this reasoning and have ex-
empted religious counselors from professional licensing require-
ments. 6 5 Although not conclusive, these exemption statutes represent
strong evidence that these legislatures, as policy-making bodies, have
already balanced the competing societal interest and decided in favor
of the clergy. 68 Thus, "the Legislature[s] ha[ve] recognized that access
to the clergy for counseling should be free from state imposed counsel-
ing standards, and that 'the secular state is not equipped to ascertain
the competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated with
religious organizations.' 11117 Although courts sometimes are forced into
the role of policymaker, when the legislature has spoken on an issue
courts must defer to the legislature's pronouncements. In terms of
counseling, legislatures have had the opportunity to impose liability.
Instead of equating spiritual counselors with secular psychologists,
however, legislatures chose to grant an explicit exemption. Accordingly,
"[a]ny argument that these competing interests should be reweighed is
164. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, _-, 763 P.2d
948, 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 108-09 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
165. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2908 (West Supp. 1989) (ordained clergy may
do "work of psychological nature ... provided they do not hold themselves out ... [as]
licensed to practice psychology"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3004(3) (1987) (professional
counselor regulations do not apply to any type of "religious activity of any nature what-
soever."); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 319.015(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (clergy's
ministerial activities not included as practice of psychology provided clergy does not hold
himself out as psychologist); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.505(6) (Vernon 1989) (licensing ex-
emption for religious counselors); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 31.02(a)(3)(iii) (McKinney
1988) (no operating certificate required for pastoral counselors); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4757.16(D) (Anderson 1987) (religious counselors exempt from professional counseling
regulations); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 59, § 1353(a) (West 1989) (licensing requirements do
not apply to "pastoral counselors, doing work of psychological nature consistent with
their training"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-55-90(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986) (regulations for psy-
chologists do not apply to "clergymen. . . doing work of a psychological nature consis-
tent with their training").
166. Cf. Northrup v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 276, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1987). In Northrup the California Court of Appeal reversed a criminal prosecution of
two members of the Church of the First Born. Since the religion does not allow the use
of any medical professionals, the defendants acted as midwives to help in childbirth.
After two of three children delivered were stillborn, the state prosecuted the defendants
for practicing medicine without a license. The appeals court dismissed the charges, how-
ever, on the ground that the midwives asserted a valid religious exemption to the licens-
ing statute even though the midwives were practicing medicine. Thus, in applying the
statute, the court deferred to the 'legislature's determination that "in the licensing con-
text, the state's interests [in preserving life] are subservient to its citizen's religious be-
liefs." Id. at 283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
167. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, _, 763
P.2d 948, 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109 (1988) (quoting Ericsson, supra note 13, at 176),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
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one best addressed to the Legislature, not the courts."' 68
Furthermore, the statutory exemptions also show that the public
interest can be protected by a less restrictive means than tort liability.
The statutes generally allow the licensing boards to exempt only those
who "do not state or imply that they are licensed to practice psychol-
ogy."1 9 Thus, these legislatures have implemented a sound method of
preventing fraud on the government and on the consumer while pr-e-
serving the autonomy of spiritual counselors. In light of this alterna-
tive, tort liability cannot be considered essential to protect the public
from spiritual counselors. Tort liability, however, could harm the pub-
lic interest by chilling spiritual counseling. Thus, there is no overriding
government interest to justify burdening religion. The free exercise
clause therefore should be recognized as a defense to suits alleging neg-
ligent counseling when clergy are involved.
C. The Establishment Clause
Assuming the government could identify some state interest that
outweighs the burden on religious freedom, the establishment clause
170
may still bar liability for negligent religious counseling. Without con-
sidering competing interests, the establishment clause further protects
personal liberty by prohibiting any government regulation that ad-
vances or inhibits religion.171 Indeed, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
168. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
169. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2908 (West Supp. 1988); see also OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit
59, § 1353(1) (West 1989) (pastoral counselors exempt from licensing provided they do
not hold themselves out as psychologists).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The part of the first amendment known as the establish-
ment clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion .... The establishment clause was first applied to the states via the fourteenth
amendment in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
171. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
The court of appeal in Nally held that the establishment clause did not apply to
clergy malpractice actions because it was limited to instances "when a government policy
has the effect of promoting religion." Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,
240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 230 (Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after rever-
sal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1644 (1989); see also Note, supra note 6, at 424 n.16 (arguing that establishment clause
only protects public from imposition of state supported religion). The court of appeal's
interpretation in Nally, however, ignores established case law. See Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 616-17 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which the court has
described the establishment clause as covering state action that advanced religion or
tended "to 'disprove,' 'inhibit,' or evince 'hostility' toward religion"); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (rejecting NLRB's claim to jurisdiction over lay faculty
members at a religious school on statutory and establishment grounds); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (rejecting taxation of churches on establishment grounds);
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constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in . . religion . or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.' 1 72 As a result, "[t]he 'estab-
lishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church
. . . [and] [n]either can force . . . a person . . . to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion.
'173
Conflicts between religion and government, however, never appear
as clear cut as this basic constitutional doctrine. As a result, the Su-
preme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,174 developed an analytical frame-
work for establishment cases, which it has frequently and consistently
applied for almost twenty years: 75 "[f]irst, the . . . [government ac-
tion] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the . . . [action] must not foster 'an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.' ,,17" Thus, any attempt to hold clergy liable
for malpractice must pass each establishment threshold to pass first
amendment scrutiny.
1. Secular Purpose
Under the first prong of the Lemmon test, the government must
see also 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 48, § 17.16 (government inter-
ference in religious organization may violate establishment clause if the action inhibits
religion or creates excessive entanglement with the religious organization); Esbeck, supra
note 50, at 379 ("[T]he establishment clause filters out improper involvement travelling
in either direction.").
172. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
173. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
174. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
175. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) ("The Lemon test has
been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court ... based its conclusion ... on the historical accept-
ance of the practice." (parallel citations omitted)).
Parts of the Lemon test, however, have been strongly criticized by at least five jus-
tices. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (questioning the effectiveness of the Lemon test, Justice Kennedy noted that
"[s]ubstantial revision of our establishment clause doctrine may be in order ... ."); Ed-
wards, 482 U.S. at 636-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the purpose prong of the
Lemon test should be abolished); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1984) (O'Conner,
J., concurring) ("standards announced in Lemon should be re-examined and refined");
Id. at 112 (Renquist, J., dissenting) (court should discard Lemon test entirely); Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (Lemon
standard provides unnecessary and superfluous tests).
176. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970) (citation omitted)).
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prove the regulation is based on a secular purpose. Conceivably, a
court could impose liability on a spiritual counselor to punish a partic-
ular sect. A court is far more likely, however, to impose liability to
advance a secular purpose. 17 Under the secular purpose prong of the
test, government interference will be invalidated only when there is no
secular purpose and "'there [is] no question that the statute or activ-
ity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.' "178 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has found a violation of the secular purpose prong
in only four establishment cases,'7 9 and probably would not find such a
violation if a court held a member of the clergy liable for malpractice.
2. Primary Effect
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the government must
prove the primary effect of the regulation neither advances nor inhibits
religion. To violate the effect prong of the test, however, the conse-
quences of a regulation only need to be significant or substantial,
rather than merely remote, indirect or incidental.
8 0
Applying this principle to clergy malpractice, a court must evalu-
ate the effect of liability on religion. In making this application, a court
could find that the primary effect of imposing tort liability would be to
inhibit religion, even though other state interests were being served.
Clearly, religion would be substantially inhibited if a court used mal-
practice liability to restrain religious instruction that it considered
damaging to counselees.' s ' Moreover, if courts were to establish a secu-
lar standard of care, they would in effect be elevating psychology over
177. See supra notes 142-59 and accompanying text (discussing possible state inter-
est in regulating spiritual counseling).
178. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).
179. The cases in which the Court has found a violation of the secular purpose
prong are Edwards, 482 U.S. 578; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
180. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-79 (1970) (tax exemption effects
only indirect benefit to church); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961) (Sun-
day closing laws valid even when they incidentally give aid to religion). Thus the Court
has dispelled any notion that the word primary means first in order of development.
Although Justice Clark appeared to apply a strict definition of "primary" in the first
formulation of the test in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the
Supreme Court has construed the "primary effect" requirement significantly looser in
subsequent establishment cases. See L. MANNING, THE LAW OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
139 (1980).
181. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 235
n.12 (Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal.
3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
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religion.1s2 This application of a secular standard of care to pastoral
counseling would implicate significant first amendment issues' and
could substantially burden religion. Finally, because liability may not
serve the purported interest, the primary result of clergy malpractice
liability would be a burden on religious autonomy and a decline in
spiritual counseling activities.'84
The Supreme Court, however, has traditionally invoked the pri-
mary effect prong of the Lemon test to stop government action that
advances religion, rather than to forbid action that hinders religion.' 5
A court could thus conclude that exempting clergy from liability would
tend to establish religion, but that liability would treat religion neu-
trally by dealing with clergy in the same manner as other nonprofes-
sional counselors. This argument, however, misconceives the purpose
and nature of the freedom of religion. Under the first amendment,
"'the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious
practices and . . it may do so without violating the Establishment
Clause.' "188 Furthermore, "[tihere is ample room under the Establish-
182. If the tort of clergy malpractice were allowed, the first question would be how
to determine the appropriate standard against which the clergy's counseling practices
would be measured. Would the court allow testimony on this question from a licensed
mental health professional, or from a member of the clergy who approached counseling
from the same religious beliefs as the defendant counselor? If the former, then the court
would be determining that secular counseling is the norm against which spiritual coun-
seling should be measured.
183. Case law proscribes government determination of the validity of religious be-
liefs. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text. More importantly, however, govern-
ment should not discourage religion in general or show a preference for one religion over
another. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
184. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text. All of the factors which prove
that liability would be coercive under the free exercise clause also establish how the ex-
pression of religious beliefs would be inhibited under the establishment clause. The inev-
itable affront to religious autonomy and the resulting chill on counseling efforts demon-
strate that the primary effect of the imposition of liability would be to inhibit religion.
185. See L. MANNING, supra note 180, at 137-97 (surveying "primary effect" cases).
186. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("intentional governmental advancement of religion is
sometimes required for Free Exercise Clause"); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). Finding no violation of the establishment clause when New York schools allowed
students to attend religious classes for part of the day, the Zorach court noted:
When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accom-
modates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe.
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ment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exer-
cise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.' ""
Moreover, exemption from liability for clerical counselors may be
required under the establishment clause to avoid a greater establish-
ment conflict. For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 8  the Court
held that even though a property tax exemption for churches showed
some governmental preference for religion, exemptions resulted in less
involvement than taxation would require. s9 Thus, the minimal accom-
modation of religion involved in granting an exemption had the pri-
mary effect of avoiding excessive governmental entanglement, a greater
establishment problem. The Court's reasoning in Walz similarly ap-
plies to issues surrounding the imposition of liability for clergy mal-
practice. Although exemption from tort liability for spiritual dounselors
would benefit religion, it would prevent a greater establishment prob-
lem by avoiding the coercion and entanglement that results from gov-
ernmental interference. An exemption from tort liability would not ad-
vance religion,8 0 but liability might inhibit spiritual counseling
activity.
3. Government Entanglement
Although the existence of any one of the three elements of the
Lemon test creates an establishment of religion, the entanglement re-
quirement remains the heart of the test. Indeed, "[t]he objective [of
the establishment clause] is to prevent . . . the intrusion of either
[state or religion] into the precincts of the other."' 9' The principle is
obvious: "government must avoid any involvement with religious socie-
ties that may touch upon the matters central to their religious identity
and mission.'' 1 2 As a result, the test is violated by a showing of actual
or even a material risk of entanglement. 193
Nevertheless, the entanglement element requires a balancing of
Id. at 313-14.
187. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
188. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
189. Id. at 674-76.
190. In addition to meeting the "primary effect" test, tort immunity for spiritual
counselors would also pass muster under the other prongs of the Lemon test. First, there
is a strong secular purpose supporting immunity. See supra notes 160-68 and accompa-
nying text (social benefits of clerical counseling). Second, immunity would not create
excessive entanglement because the government would not be involved at all with the
counselors. On the other hand, liability may well create excessive entanglement. See in-
fra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
191. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
192. Esbeck, supra note 49, at 381.
193. Id.
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competing interests rather than serving as an absolute threshold. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has identified at least three factors to
examine in addressing an entanglement issue:
[First], [i]f the religious organization is "pervasively religious," it is
unlikely that the governmental contact is permissible. Second....
[i]f the regulation provides the public official with sufficient discretion
to trespass upon sectarian concerns, the involvement is likely prohib-
ited. Third, . . . [i]f that relationship is one requiring continued sur-
veillance by public officials, the entanglement is likely excessive.
194
Under these principles, the establishment clause may bar governmen-
tal intervention or judicial oversight into matters of a religious organi-
zation's prayer practices,195 preaching, 19 faith,197 doctrine,'98 internal
administration, 9 and discipline. 00
Tort liability for clergy malpractice would inevitably collide with
these principles. First a church's counseling ministry is pervasively re-
ligious.201 Second, liability would give courts the discretion to judge the
validity of sectarian concerns. Third, the imposition of liability would
require courts to actually establish standards of appropriate conduct
for counselors and content of counseling. 0 2 Thus, imposition of tort
liability probably would require courts to evaluate the substantive cor-
194. Id. at 383-84 (footnote ommitted) (detailing the three primary factors to which
the Supreme Court has directed attention).
195. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 420, 435 (1962) (Court struck down mandatory
school prayer, stating that religion should be left "to the people themselves and those
the people choose to look to for religious guidance.").
196. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (Jehovah's Witness allowed
to conduct religious service in public place and government barred from regulating reli-
gious sermons).
197. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (courts cannot deter-
mine truth or falsity of belief).
198. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1968) (property dispute between two churches beyond
scope of courts, since civil courts are prohibited from interpreting or weighing church
doctrine).
199. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (NLRB cannot con-
demn church employment practices, since governmental review would "involve inquiry
into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relation-
ship to [its] school's religious mission").
200. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)
(court could not decide which bishop should lead organization because civil courts are
prohibited from delving into matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesi-
astical rules, custom or law).
201. See supra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
202. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 236
(Ct. App. 1987) (opinion deleted from official reporter after reversal), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d
278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
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rectness of religious doctrines and teachings. Yet the Supreme Court
has established that civil courts are not competent "to approve, disap-
prove, classify, regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at
religious meetings."2 ' Spiritual counseling can be considered a private
sermon tailored to the needs of an individual.0 4 Furthermore, even if
counseling could be distinguished from other religious instruction, the
principle that government should not prescribe the content of religious
communications should still apply. The same constitutional principles
also safeguard religious doctrine from governmental interference. 20 5
Nevertheless, tort liability for spiritual counseling would allow the gov-
ernment to affect instruction and doctrine.
Clergy malpractice also could interfere with the church's internal
administrative procedures. To provide any meaningful protection for
the public, courts would have to establish the training standards that
churches would have to require of their pastors, as well as the conduct
that would be expected of spiritual counselors. 206 Any oversight of reli-
gious organizations by government, however, could create establish-
ment problems. Even though the interaction might only involve secular
concerns, "under our [constitutional] system . . . government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction ....
Clearly, as a result of imposing liability for clergy malpractice, the gov-
ernment could become entangled in church affairs.
In summary, tort liability for negligent counseling could create an
establishment of religion. Even though liability for clergy malpractice
might spring from a secular purpose, the primary effect of the tort
could inhibit religious practices and could lead to excessive governmen-
tal entanglement with religion. Thus, tort liability for counseling does
not satisfy the Lemon test, and under establishment clause jurispru-
dence, government action that fails any prong of the test is
unconstitutional.
20 8
III. CONCLUSION
The concept of clergy malpractice presents complex and trouble-
203. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
204. See J. ADAMS, supra note 80, at 65-77.
205. See supra note 198.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 117 & 120 (discussing minimum standards
of conduct).
207. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971); see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. 490 (1979); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
208. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (recognizing that clear violation
of one prong of the test was sufficient to create establishment without examining other
two elements).
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some questions of constitutional law. Like many undecided constitu-
tional issues, no one can completely reconcile the conflicting body of
case law; no one can throughly analyze the issue without acknowledg-
ing that the arguments posited by each side are persuasive; and no one
can predict with certainty how the Supreme Court ultimately will rule.
Nevertheless, in evaluating the constitutional implications of spiritual
counseling liability, this note suggests that the first amendment may
bar the cause of action.
The Constitution prevents courts from determining the truth or
falsity of a belief and from dissecting any system of belief. Accordingly,
courts should accept a pastor's sincerely held belief that counseling is
an inherently religious activity. Under free exercise analysis, tort liabil-
ity would burden the religious practices of spiritual counselors. Despite
the state interest in regulating counseling, any potential damage result-
ing from pastoral counseling may not justify burdening religion.
Clergy malpractice may also create an establishment of religion.
Although a valid secular purpose exists, the primary effect of liability
may be to inhibit religious practices and excessively entangle the gov-
ernment in religious affairs. No doubt, spiritual counselors will admin-
ister a certain amount of "mental and spiritual poison .. . But that is
precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the lrose-
cutor, . . . [and that is] the price of freedom of religion ... ."209
Constitutional impunity for negligent counseling, however, would
not exempt clergy from existing theories of liability. Liability for inten-
tional torts remains a potent weapon in a lawyer's arsenal to guarantee
that any outrageous conduct will be punished. Furthermore, criminal
sanctions protect society from members of the clergy who engage in
destructive conduct. No reasonable person would contend that a minis-
ter who sexually abuses children or commits a religious sacrifice should
be insulated from punishment, even if the action was religiously moti-
vated. The content of spiritual advice, however, raises a different con-
stitutional issue, and, as a result, negligent spiritual counseling should
not be the basis for a tort recovery.
Constitutional impunity for negligent counseling also should not
discourage clergy from maintaining the highest counseling standards
possible. Religious leaders generally regard themselves as responsible
to a higher power and believe that higher power has placed the coun-
selees in their care. Furthermore, the counselors usually feel a sense of
responsibility to the counselees, who have placed their trust in the
counselors' advice.210 Finally, spiritual and ethical duties require pas-
209. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
210. Additionally, there is now an American Association of Pastoral Counselors,
which may hold a member-pastor accountable to the organization's ethical code just as a
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tors to accept instruction, both spiritual and secular, to become compe-
tent counselors fully apprised of potential problems.
Unfortunately, some counselors will not live up to these ethical
standards. But there will be others who, despite their compliance,
could still be sued under the theory of clergy malpractice. Just as in
Nally, a minister could competently advise a counselee to seek addi-
tional help and still face liability for the religious content of the coun-
sel and for failing to place a counselee in the hands of a professional.
Such content-based liability could not be avoided with the highest eth-
ical standards. Thus, a minister could be held liable for unpopular reli-
gious instruction, a result which is antithetical to first amendment val-
ues. Impunity, however, would protect this constitutional interest.
Undoubtedly, some self-serving counselors will use the constitutional
shield as a sword to take advantage of the freedom. But even accepting
the potential abuse, a balancing of societal interests suggests that
clergy should not be held liable for negligent counseling. More impor-
tantly, the Constitution demands it.
James K. Lehman
state bar association may do with lawyers. For the organization's complete code of ethics,
see H. MALONEY, T. NEEDHAM & S. SOUTHARD, CLERGY MALPRACTICE 154 (1986) (repro-
duced in book appendix).
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